May 11, 2004
U.S.
Unilateralism and Transatlantic Relations
…. a view from The Atlantic Community Initiative
[This text is a summary of the chapter on U.S. Power
and Influence in Europe to be published in
June 2004 by the Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy
as part of a larger study entitled The Use of U.S. Power: Implications for
U.S. Interests]
The
alliance between the United
States and Europe
was at the heart of the Cold War strategy against the Soviet threat and
remains a vitally important political, economic and security relationship in the
post-Cold War era. However, the large capabilities and threat perception gaps
between the United States
in Europe have in recent years grown
increasingly problematic for the alliance. Now, widespread European
perceptions that the United
States intends to have its way in
international relations regardless of the views of allied countries or the
standards of international law have seriously undermined the trust in and
respect for the United
States.
The
troubled relationship between the United States and Europe has already
directly affected US interests, producing strong European resistance to the
US war against Iraq, limiting international involvement in the process of
stabilizing and reconstructing post-war Iraq, undermining European
governments that did support US policy in Iraq, raising credibility issues
about US intelligence resources and political judgment, and weakening the
ability of the United States to use its “soft power” to influence
attitudes and policies in European countries.
A continued
pattern of perceived or actual US unilateralism could produce
significant costs for US
foreign policy. The
long-established democratic governments in Western
Europe all carry forward a strong commitment to the values on
which international cooperation, law and organization has been based since
the Second World War. Many of these governments and peoples instinctively
feel that the system is not owned just by the United States. They believe their
democracies played a role in creating and sustaining the system. When the
United States attempts to change underlying aspects of that system, and
particularly when the US government attempts to do so unilaterally based on
overwhelming US power, they are inclined to question and perhaps even oppose
such US efforts.
If the United States
continues to be seen by majorities in most European countries as an
overbearing, hegemonic power, it will be increasingly difficult for European
political parties to take positions that are openly warm and friendly toward
the United States.
Over time, the United
States could find it increasingly
difficult to line up support behind its policies.
Such a long-term shift in public and governmental
attitudes could seriously undermine US “soft power” foreign
policy resources. At a time when the military power of the United States
remained superior to that of any other country or group of countries, US
influence could decline, particularly in circumstances where it had to rely
on the trust and cooperation of other governments. On the other hand, a
return to more traditional US
foreign policy behavior that includes a mix of multilateral cooperation and
unilateral actions when necessary as well as a balanced blend of hard and
soft power would undoubtedly begin to mitigate current European concerns about
the US
role in the world.
At a time
when the American people feel under imminent threat from terrorist attacks,
the President can say, as President Bush did in his January 2004 State of the
Union address, that the United States does not need a “permission
slip” from anybody to defend itself. This remains true, even in
“normal” times. However, US public opinion surveys for
over a decade have reflected the belief of a vast majority of Americans that
the United States
should help maintain international peace, but should share burdens and
responsibilities with friends and allies. To respond to this American
sentiment over the long term will require US policies and actions that
attract support and involvement from key US allies in Europe
and around the globe.
December 11, 2003 A Policy of Reward
and Retribution:
Bush administration shoots itself and
transatlantic relations in the foot
….
a view from The Atlantic Community Initiative
Just when it appeared the Bush administration was
attempting to broaden the base of international support for Iraqi
stabilization and reconstruction, the administration unilaterally shot itself
and US interests in the foot. George Bush was preparing to call the leaders
of Germany, France and Russia to ask them to forgive old Iraqi debt when a
directive from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz – cleared by
a White House-led committee – was posted on the Pentagon web site
specifying that only coalition members would be eligible to serve as prime
contractors for US-financed reconstruction projects in Iraq. This eliminated
the three countries Bush was about to ask for Iraqi debt relief and many others.
The predictable reaction was immediate. German foreign
minister Joschka Fischer said that the move
“wouldn’t be in line with the spirit of looking to the future
together and not into the past.” The directive undermined the
diplomatic efforts of Secretary of State Powell and special envoy and former
Secretary of State James Baker to build international support for Iraqi debt
relief. Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov reportedly reacted by opposing
any forgiveness of Iraq’s
$120 billion debt, $8 billion of which is owed to Russia. Ivanov noted “Iraq is not a
poor country.” Before President Bush explained that Canada would
not be excluded, Canada’s
pro-American prime minister designate, Paul Martin, apparently astounded by
the US
action, said “I find it difficult to fathom. There is a huge amount of
suffering going on there, and I think it is the responsibility of every
country to participate in developing it.”
The directive apparently would not prevent non-coalition
partner companies from serving as sub-contractors and therefore would not
necessarily exclude them from participating in and profiting from
reconstruction funds. The political damage done, however, is substantial.
Iraqi reconstruction will suffer. US international influence will
be further diminished.
The administration’s approach raises a number of
questions about the administration’s foreign policy management: Why is
policy toward Iraq
reconstruction and allied relations apparently so poorly coordinated –
isn’t that what a national security advisor is for? How can Secretary
of State Powell continue to serve an administration that constantly undercuts
its own diplomatic efforts, weakens America’s alliances, and
tarnishes America’s
international image?
Even more important, why does the administration insist on
further damaging relations with good friends and allies? Does it not
understand how such decisions will be received, or does it not care? The
latter seems more likely, and so administration officials consciously set out
to punish those governments that were skeptical about the
administration’s rationale for going to war. The President claims the
approach was designed to reward coalition partners who were putting lives on
the line for the cause. If asked, leaders of the key partners – Britain, Italy and Spain, for
example – undoubtedly would have wisely recommended against being
rewarded in a way that only exacerbated transatlantic divisions.
In recent weeks it looked as if
the administration might have learned how much the United States needs international
cooperation to achieve its national objectives. But it has once again
demonstrated that its base instincts are more inspired by reward (for
coalition partners) and retribution (for war opponents) than reconstruction
of Iraq
or rehabilitation of US-allied relations.
March 4, 2003 Transatlantic
Relations the Day after Iraq
…. a view from The Atlantic Community Initiative
The transatlantic debate over Iraq has revealed a number of
truths about US and European approaches to international relations. The fact
that the United States
is more, and European nations relatively less, willing to use force to deal
with international security issues was observed by some in the 1980s. This
fact has been rediscovered and even exaggerated by contemporary
neo-conservative pundits.
The profound transatlantic differences over use of force against Iraq have
exposed Bush administration cynicism that many Bush officials brought with
them into their government jobs. Recent events undoubtedly have reinforced
their view of Europeans as feckless friends, some of whom they no longer even
regard as friends and allies. Many Members of Congress appear to be competing
with popular comedians and commentators to see who can better bash European
allies that disagree with US
policy.
Before Iraq,
there was a persistent but minority residue of anti-Americanism around Europe, ready to be energized by the right
circumstances. The Bush administration with its unilateral behavior, "with
us or against us" attitudes, and fundamentalist, unshakable beliefs in
clear distinctions between right and wrong in the world has swollen the ranks
of those in Europe who mistrust current US policy directions and question US
motivations and values. Taken together, the excesses of the recent debate on
top of the real policy issues have driven transatlantic relations to new
lows.
The bottom line is that the United States and Europe still need each other. Our economies are so
deeply intermingled that if less responsible members of Congress had their
way and imposed bans on European products, American firms would suffer
collateral damage.
Moreover, the international community needs this "crucial
couple" to find some form of marital harmony. Working together, the United States
and Europe have the wits and resources to
deal with most international problems. In the absence of such cooperation -
as recently demonstrated over Iraq
- the international community simply doesn't function very well.
So how do we get out of the hole we have mutually dug for ourselves?
The United States, for its part, faces the challenge of using its power in
ways that reflect U.S. values and draw on the American public's desire to
cooperate with other countries while not inspiring opposition by being too
domineering. In other words, the United States has to learn how to
be a hegemon without acting like one. (This is not the first time
this advice has appeared on these pages, but it remains necessary advice
nonetheless!!)
If U.S.
allies still believe that U.S.
leadership is essential on many international issues, as they apparently do,
then their challenge is to express their criticism of U.S.
leadership style in terms that are appropriate for frank and honest discussions
among friends, and in ways that will promote US-European cooperation, not
make it more difficult.
The sense of "community" among the transatlantic nations has
been the first victim of the crisis over Iraq. On the "day after Iraq,"
the United States
and Europe will need to breathe new life
into the sense of common destiny among the Atlantic community of nations. For
those who share this belief, the time has come to start preparing a
re-awakening of transatlantic good will and cooperation.
No matter how the Iraq
issue is resolved, we should now begin preparation of a new Atlantic
Community Treaty, reaffirming the broad area of U.S-European shared values
and interests. The treaty would have both political and functional goals.
· Politically, such a major political act would shift the
focus of US-European relations toward all that we have in common and away
from the exclusive focus on what divides us.
· Functionally, the treaty among all members of NATO and the
European Union would create a soft-power framework of cooperation to
complement the hard power frameworks of NATO and the EU's Common European
Security and Defense Policy.
This will not be easy; attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic
today make it even more difficult. However, without a renewed sense of common
destiny, the United States
would be weaker and less predictable and Europe
would be less confident and much less secure.
April 19, 2002 A Deepening Strategy
for Transatlantic Relations
…. a view from The Atlantic Community Initiative
Much time and energy is being spent preparing the next stage of NATO
enlargement, with the expectation that as many as seven countries may be
invited to join the alliance when allied leaders meet in Prague this November. The continued process
of enlargement, in parallel with strengthening NATO-Russia ties, is good for
European stability. However, the allies desperately need to deepen their
relationship as well as widen the membership to deal with the current crisis
in the alliance.
NATO has seen and survived many crises in its history. At the end of the
Cold War, the transatlantic allies decided the alliance remained relevant to
contemporary challenges, and agreed to adapt the alliance to meet those
challenges.
However, after a decade of post-Cold War experience, the allies find
themselves in a crisis of capabilities and confidence. The European allies,
in spite of commitments made in the context of NATO's 1999 Defense
Capabilities Initiative and the European Union's defense "headline
goals," have fallen far behind the United States ability to field
military forces on a modern battlefield.
Throughout the Cold War, there was a persistent gap between US and
European capabilities. To a certain extent, a European defense dependence
culture has taken hold, while a unilateralist impulse comes to the fore in Washington.
Some on both sides of the Atlantic say let's make a virtue out of
necessity, and divide burdens in the alliance in a way that takes advantage
of US and European strengths. In such a formula, put simply, the United States
would take care of the "warfighting" while Europe
provided peacekeeping forces and finances for reconstruction and development.
However, NATO unity has always been predicated on sharing risks and responsibilities.
Dividing those burdens to deal with future security problems would only
intensify European and American differences about how to interpret
international security problems and which instruments to use to deal with
them - the United States always quicker to resort to the use of force, Europe
always reluctant to do so.
The unchallenged US
status as the only true global superpower can have positive or negative
consequences internationally, depending on how the United States uses its position.
The trouble for transatlantic relations comes when the United States,
which can't help the fact that it is a hegemonic power, also acts like one.
This has been the criticism of the George W. Bush administration, which has
appeared not to wish to be bound by international agreements it finds
disagreeable or by allies and alliances when if find them inconvenient. This
behavior has created the "confidence" side of the current crisis,
raising the question of whether or not the United States has faith in the
transatlantic alliance.
In the past, when the transatlantic relationship faced a crisis, the
allies acted to overcome the difficulties by strengthening their ties. Today,
the allies face the same choice: act to strengthen the Atlantic Community or
risk its growing irrelevance.
The United States
and Europe continue to need each other. In
spite of their differences, they share much more with each other than with
any other country or group of countries in the world. When the United States
and Europe cooperate - as they must to have
an effective war against terrorism, for example - things get done. When they
do not cooperate, international cooperation more generally grinds to a halt.
The transatlantic allies therefore need a deepening strategy to move from
crisis to a new level of cooperation. Many elements of the strategy are
already written down, and simply need to be implemented. The European allies
must implement the defense goals represented by their NATO and European Union
commitments. The EU members should continue to work toward their goal of
developing a 60,000 troop expeditionary force capable of autonomous
operation, but should put a higher priority on developing a smaller and more
capable set of air, naval and ground forces, equipped and trained to operate
on a modern battlefield with the United States. An American
analyst, Hans Binnendijk, has
argued that a "spearhead force" of a few brigades and air squadrons
with modern sensors, secure data links, all-weather capabilities and improved
logistics would help Europe "plug
into" future US
military operations.
In addition, NATO should create a counter-terrorism combined joint task
force command. Such a command should bring together the military services of
allied countries, along with required civilian expertise and officials, to
provide a focus for NATO's support of future counter-terrorist operations.
In Prague,
the allies should strengthen their commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty's
Article 4, which says that they will "consult together whenever, in the
opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or
security of any of the Parties is threatened." The commitment to deal
with threats to their security does not impose geographic limits on the
source of such threats or on the area of operations against them.
For its part, the United
States has to be more sensitive to its
need for allies and for the transatlantic alliance, even if it appears that
any one military operation does not require their direct involvement. US defense
planning has recently paid little attention to the requirements for coalition
operations. The United
States should, at a minimum, make a
"coalition operations pledge" that it will ask "how will this
affect our ability to operate in coalitions with our allies?" in all
future decisions about US
strategy, doctrine and weapons systems development.
And, even thought the United
States will retain many characteristics of
a hegemon in international relations, it must make an effort not to act like
one.
Finally, it is critically important that the United States and Europe renew their commitment to the Atlantic Community
as well as broaden the framework for their cooperation. They can do this by
appointing a new "wise men's" committee to prepare a new Atlantic
Community Treaty. The treaty should be based on the North Atlantic Treaty's
statement of common values and objectives, but then expand transatlantic
cooperation to include political, economic and other areas that go beyond
NATO's mandate. Such a new Atlantic Community would embrace NATO and US-EU
cooperation, not replace them.
Such a deepening strategy would not resolve all issues between the United States
and Europe, but it would reaffirm their
commitment to work through issues and challenges with a renewed sense of common
purpose. With a deepening and widening strategy, the Atlantic Community
nations could face the future with confidence in the continued vitality of
transatlantic cooperation.
March 26, 2002 Don’t Write
Off the Allies
….
a view from The Atlantic Community Initiative
(adapted from an “op ed”
by Robert P. Grant and Stanley
R. Sloan in the March 25-31 Defense News)
The “hurrahs” had barely faded from NATO’s invocation of
Article 5 after the September 11 terrorist attacks when the latest crisis in
the alliance began. In spite of the unprecedented step by the allies, the United States
largely ignored the alliance and initially brushed aside most offers of
assistance, conducting its own campaign against the al Qaeda terrorist
organization and their Taliban government hosts in Afghanistan.
That the European allies could be of little help in the tightly focused,
high tech campaign far from Europe’s
borders was of no doubt. European military deficiencies clearly warranted the
United States’
running the early stages of the operation with the involvement of British
special forces and a modicum of support from other allies. The
“lessons” of the Afghanistan
campaign, the dramatic increases planned for the US defense budget, and the weak
state of European defense spending, have all combined to promote a view in Washington that
European participation in warfighting operations alongside the United States
is both unnecessary and undesirable. The new paradigm of the US fights,
the UN feeds, and the EU funds peacekeeping and reconstruction has thus
gained many US
adherents.
Confirming such tendencies in policy, however, would certainly lead the
United States and its allies in the wrong directions, exacerbating the
current “gaps” in the alliance and encouraging the tendency
toward divergent US and European views on international security challenges
and especially on preferred responses. Dividing “warfighting and
“peacekeeping” roles between the United States and Europe could ensure NATO’s demise as a place
where the United States
and Europe coordinate military efforts. This
may be the eventual outcome of current trends. However, it is premature for
the United States
to give up on its allies, and for the allies to give up on efforts to develop
the capabilities to fight alongside the United States in future
conflicts.
The indisputable view that the Europeans are not doing enough on defense
has been unfairly transformed into a belief that they are not doing anything
to improve defense capabilities. A non-governmental four nation (France, Great Britain,
Germany
and the US)
project organized by US-CREST, a transatlantic research institute based in Arlington, Virginia,
is currently studying how the development of a common European Security and
Defense Policy may affect the conduct of transatlantic coalition operations
over the next 15 years. The results so far suggest that, while Europe could use much more investment in defense, the
major European military establishments are aiming to be able to conduct
future operations on the kind of high tech battlefield that currently is the
exclusive US
domain. Scheduled improvements in communications, intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance, all weather precision weaponry, strategic mobility, and
force projection over the next 15 years, if carried out, should produce
European forces that are more capable of conducting operations in a great
variety of battlefield conditions in coalition with the United States
and, to a lesser extent, on their own if necessary.
US
dismissal of the goal of conducting warfighting operations in coalition with
its closest allies would have the effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy,
convincing European politicians that it is not worth the effort to devote
resources to building modern military capabilities. If the United States
wants to have allies with whom to share the military and political burdens of
future military operations, it must make a conscious decision to promote that
objective, not appear to be discouraging it. It is therefore notable that
forces from several NATO countries, including some 1700 British Royal
Marines, have joined the United
States in the current and dangerous phase
of the war against the residual al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan.
Defense circles in the major European nations understand the real need to
maintain significant warfighting capabilities, and the ability to operate as
effectively as possible with the United States in any coalition
military intervention. On the other hand, many European politicians and
diplomats would be perfectly happy to see Europe
limited to humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, and use it as
justification for further cutting defense budgets.
US
policy will play an important role in helping decide this debate. To most the
European debate in the right direction, the Bush Administration needs to make
it clear that it continues to value having militarily capable allies, and to
back that up with concrete decisions such as the technology transfer reforms
NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson has been urging. Such a choice could
help tip the balance in favor of the development of 21st century
combat capabilities on the part of the major European militaries.
December 4, 2001 Russia and
NATO: An Evolutionary Development
…. a view from The Atlantic Community Initiative
NATO and Russia
have in recent weeks moved toward a new, more cooperative relationship. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and
NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson have proposed creation of a new
NATO-Russia body in which decisions would actually be taken. Russian President Vladimir Putin
apparently is considering these suggestions favorably. Such a step would represent a major
change in Russia’s
relationship with NATO, but must be seen in perspective to understand its
limits as well as its potential.
The
military and ideological threat posed by the Soviet
Union, with Russia
at its core, along with European concerns about a resurgent Germany,
provided the original stimulus for the 1949 transatlantic bargain. These two factors also provided
motivation for the steps taken in the 1940s and 1950s to initiate the process
of European unification. Decades
of liberal German democracy, loyalty to the Western alliance, and the process
of European integration dissipated the German “threat.” When the Soviet
Union imploded at the end of the Cold War, the United States
and its European allies discovered that even though this founding threat was
also disappearing, the cooperation that had developed over the years was not
only based on solid common values and interests, but also had continuing
utility in a post-Soviet world.
Nevertheless,
Russia
remained a major factor in allied calculations. In spite of Russia’s devastated economy
and military forces that were incapable of putting down rebellion in the
former Soviet Republic of Chechnya, Russia remained a world-class
nuclear power and a huge variable in Europe’s
future. The development of a
liberal democratic system in Russia
would constitute a dramatic gain for international peace and stability. An autocratic, deprived and
dissatisfied Russia
would constitute a major source of instability for the indefinite
future. As a consequence, the
transatlantic allies moved carefully throughout the 1990s trying to assess
how steps that they were taking to adapt their alliance would affect and be
affected by Russia.
As
the EU and NATO began their separate processes of outreach to the new
democracies emerging in Eastern and Central Europe and figuring how to
respond to their long-repressed desires for membership in Western
institutions, neither NATO nor the EU thought that Russia would qualify for
membership in either organization for as far out as the eye could see. It was clear, however, that Russia, even
as weak as it was, remained a major player in European security.
NATO
in particular reached out to Russia
as it moved toward including the Soviet Union’s
former Central and East European “allies” in the Western security
system. Russia was offered
participation in NATO’s partnership program and then, in the context of
the first round of NATO enlargement, was given a special relationship to the
alliance with negotiation of “The Founding Act on
Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russia
Federation,” establishing a “Permanent Joint Council”
– NATO nations plus Russia – as a framework for continuing
consultations.
Russia’s
acceptance of the PJC was always grudging. Russian leaders wanted something more
– something that would appropriately acknowledge Russia’s
importance in European security. The NATO countries, on the other hand, did not want to give Russia a
direct say in NATO deliberations and certainly not a veto over NATO actions
– a concern directly expressed during the US debate on the first round of
NATO enlargement.
However,
under President Putin, an autocratic leader with pragmatic foreign policy
inclinations, Russia
and NATO have moved toward a more meaningful relationship. The most important stimulus was
provided by the September 11 terrorist attacks and Putin’s offer of
assistance in the US-declared war against terrorism. Putin’s position clearly helped
strengthen his relationship with President Bush, and facilitated work toward
agreements on dramatic cuts in strategic nuclear weapons arsenals and
possible agreements on missile defenses. Putin also hinted at new Russian perspectives on its relationship to
NATO and Russia’s
attitude toward NATO enlargement.
Once
again, Tony Blair, who had played such an important role in getting the
European Union’s Common European Security and Defense Policy on the
tracks, started the ball rolling for a new Russia-NATO initiative by
proposing creation of a new forum for Russia-NATO cooperation. Prime Minister Blair, in a letter to
NATO Secretary General George Robertson, suggested creation of a
“Russia/North Atlantic Council” which would take decisions by
consensus on certain issues affecting both NATO and Russia, for
example, terrorism, arms proliferation and peacekeeping. According to press reports, Blair
hoped that post 9/11 events could lead to a new world order, ending old
enmities and building new bridges.
Apparently
with the blessing of the Bush administration, Secretary General Robertson put
the idea forward during an official visit to Moscow. Headlines blared that “Russia
Could Get Veto Power in New NATO.” Russian conservatives worried that Putin was about to give away the
store. American conservatives
were concerned that the move might do in NATO. Polish observers fretted that this
might be the first step toward Russian membership in NATO. French commentators wondered if events
were moving too fast for rational consideration of their consequences.
In
reality, it seems likely that the road will lead to an evolutionary,
appropriate development in the Russia-NATO relationship. The Permanent Joint Council will
likely be replaced by a new “Russia-North Atlantic Council.” The new council will meet more
regularly, and will actually make decisions on some subjects. However, the regular agenda of the
North Atlantic Council will not be shifted to the new framework. The NAC will decide when issues should
be submitted to decision by the R-NAC (as NATO acronym-makers seem likely to
dub the new council) and when they should be kept within usual NATO decisionmaking channels. If the R-NAC becomes deadlocked on an
issue because of Russian disagreement, this would not bloc the NATO members
from acting in the NAC without Russian agreement or participation. Russia will not have a
“veto” over NATO decisions, only over joint Russia-NATO
decisions, which is not unreasonable.
The
advent of a more meaningful, action-oriented NATO-Russia relationship could
be a very positive development for European security. It will not block NATO decisions on
enlargement of the alliance. In
fact, just as creation of the Permanent Joint Council with Russia “accompanied”
the first round of NATO enlargement, establishment of the new Russia-North
Atlantic Council will likely parallel NATO’s decisions on the next
round of NATO enlargement, which now could begin a stream of membership
negotiations, initially with Slovenia and Slovakia and then the three Baltic
states, with Romania and Bulgaria not far behind.
Creating
a new Russia-NATO forum will not presage imminent Russian membership in the
alliance. Russia is a
long way from meeting the guidelines for membership laid out in NATO’s
1995 Study on Enlargement. Russia falls
far short particularly in terms of the internal development of liberal
democratic institutions, including a free press, and a Western-style human
rights regime. If Russia some day meets these guidelines, there truly will be a
“new world order” and Russia should then be considered a
legitimate candidate for membership. Until then, there should remain a clear distinction between what
issues are decided with members of the alliance and which are decided with
this very important Russian partner.
November 3, 2001 Terrorism Must Not Stop NATO
Enlargement
By Stanley
Sloan and Heiko Borchert
(Stanley
Sloan is Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative and a Visiting Scholar
at Middlebury College. Heiko
Borchert heads a political and business consultancy
in Lucerne, Switzerland.)
Some weeks after the terrible terrorist attacks on
American soil and on two of the world's most powerful symbols of economic and
military power, the world is still trying to adjust to these traumatic events
and their consequences. The Bush administration, despite internal differences
about the ultimate aims of its response, has launched a broadly based
diplomatic and military campaign aimed at fighting the terrorists and
countries that harbor them
How will the war against terrorism affect the pursuit of
NATO enlargement? Even before the September 11 events political interest in
and support for NATO's second enlargement round could not be compared to that
for the first round, which brought the Czech Republic,
Hungary
and Poland
into the alliance. President Bush has said that his administration is a
strong supporter of NATO enlargement. But the administration has no eager
European partner on this issue. Germany, the key European
architect of the first round, has less of a strategic stake in the next
stages and is reluctant to upset Moscow.
Now, the terrorist attacks on the United States
and their aftermath could create additional obstacles. The demanding and necessary campaign
against terror will pull resources and political attention away from other
issues, including NATO enlargement.
This coincides with a domestic European agenda that is not
very favorable to NATO's enlargement process. European Union governments are
increasingly preoccupied by the scheduled launch of the EU’s common
currency on January
1, 2002. Important
European countries such as France
and Germany
are about to go through presidential and governmental elections,
respectively.
US relations with Moscow
also could play an important role. Russian officials have declared that the
country would not provide military help for Bush's anti-terror coalition, but
Moscow seems prepared to provide at least political and intelligence support.
Some experts have argued that Russia
might want to request favors in return for its support against terrorism. Delaying
or abandoning plans to bring the Baltic states
into NATO could be such a favor. Neither the United States nor European
governments should be tempted by this option.
Launched in the early 1990s, NATO enlargement aims at
stabilizing Europe and at furthering the
spread of democracy in former Warsaw Pact countries. Together with the EU's
admission of new members, expansion of Euro-Atlantic institutions has been a
key part of the strategy aimed at extending the benefits of democracy,
economic prosperity, and international multilateral cooperation to a region
cut off from such opportunities for over 50 years. More than ten years after
the fall of the iron curtain, the basic rational for this strategy has not
changed.
How, then, should the allies proceed? Ten countries
currently seek membership in NATO. Judged by the standards set in NATO's 1995
Study on Enlargement, some of these countries could be considered close to
qualifying for an invitation. They include Slovenia, Slovakia and
the Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Two candidates, Romania
and Bulgaria,
could be strategic assets to the alliance and presumably will get invitations
further down the road. The other candidates, Albania, Macedonia and
Croatia
are even less prepared to begin formal negotiations.
The "objective" criteria of the NATO Study on
Enlargement clearly should serve as the first hurdle. Only those countries
that have made significant progress in developing their democratic
institutions, establishing free market economic systems, and moving their
military systems toward NATO standards should be on the next list of
invitations.
Second, although there should be no formal link between
NATO and European Union enlargement, the fact is that every EU member is
effectively part of the Western security system that is organized around
NATO. It is no coincidence that countries that are closest to EU membership
are either NATO members already (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) or
are strong candidates for NATO membership (like Slovenia, Slovakia, and
the Baltic states). In some European
capitals this reasoning has given rise to the idea of delaying the Baltic states' accession to NATO in favor of a quick
admission to the EU coupled with an implicit defense guarantee. However, as
the EU is not yet able to issue convincing defense guarantees, this approach
is not a compelling alternative to moving both enlargement processes ahead.
Third, even though Russia should not be accorded a
say over which country can or cannot join NATO, it is in the interest of NATO
members to try to involve Moscow
constructively in the campaign against terrorism and to strengthen links
between Russia
and NATO. NATO should offer to
open discussions with Moscow
about the technical issues associated with Baltic membership in the alliance,
like how to deal with the Kaliningrad
enclave, Russian territory between Poland and Lithuania
that would be surrounded by NATO (and EU) territory in the future. The allies
should also make clear that NATO membership for Russia is not excluded, and that,
if Russia
were interested, it would be judged on terms similar to those applying to
other candidate states.
Finally, the NATO allies in Prague next year should declare that all 10
candidates can expect to receive invitations to begin formal negotiations
with the alliance as they meet the standards set in the NATO Study on
Enlargement. As a recent NATO Parliamentary Assembly report has suggested,
the enlargement process should be converted from one of "waves" to
a "stream" of invitations. To buy some time to work through the
Baltic issues, Slovenia
and Slovakia
should be invited to begin formal negotiations in 2003 with the Baltic states beginning such talks in 2004.
Does such an approach have a chance of moving enlargement
ahead? The answer to this question begins in Washington and ends in Europe.
Only if the Bush administration decides to move enlargement ahead, in spite
of all obstacles, is there any chance of invitations being issued in Prague. However, only if the European allies
are convinced of the wisdom of continued enlargement will the Bush
administration be able to get the full consensus required for even one formal
invitation. After the first hour of fine political rhetoric, Europeans must
deliver. Extending NATO to the East will in the long run strengthen the
alliance's European pillar as well as the transatlantic link. A commitment in
Prague is
thus in Europe's interest and should receive
concrete backing.
October 12, 2001 Events Illustrate
Need for New Atlantic Community
…. a view from The Atlantic Community Initiative
In early
1995, a number of leading European officials argued that NATO remained the
necessary, but not sufficient, organizing framework for the Atlantic
Community. They called for a more broadly based transatlantic community that
would bring together the many strands of common political, cultural,
economic, and security interests between North America
and Western Europe. The proposals built on
themes that had been around since the transatlantic alliance was founded.
From the late 1940s through the 1970s, a number of proponents urged creation
of an "Atlantic Union" and the US Congress considered a variety of
resolutions aimed at stimulating this process. [See "European
Proposals for a New Atlantic Community" for more details.]
Today, in
the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States, these ideas appear
even more appropriate and timely. The attacks have highlighted the fact that
allies on both sides of the Atlantic still need NATO as an essential
framework for security cooperation. NATO's continued relevance has been made
clear by the invocation of Article 5, the Washington Treaty's mutual defense
provision, and by its operational implications, including NATO’s
commitment to help patrol US
air space with alliance AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft.
However, it
is also evident that transatlantic cooperation to respond to and deal with
the terrorist threat, did not begin and will not end with military missions.
Defense of the Atlantic Community nations from the threat of terrorist
attacks requires coordinated actions across the broad spectrum of transatlantic
relations. Creation of a "new Atlantic Community," like that
proposed in 1995, could facilitate such cooperation. It would embrace, not replace, NATO.
It would not require sacrifice of national sovereignty or threaten the
process of integration in the European Union.
A "new
Atlantic Community” would reflect the reality that the transatlantic
nations share more than a commitment to come to the defense of an ally under
attack - they share a common political, economic and security destiny. That
common future needs to be supported by an institutional framework that is
sufficiently broad to support coordinated responses to terrorist and other
challenges that the Euro-Atlantic democracies will face in the years ahead.
[See the "draft treaty" for one possible
way of creating such a broader institutional framework.]
September 16, 2001 NATO’s
Response to Terror
…. a view from The Atlantic Community Initiative
NATO
passed its first test of the 21st century, pledging allied support
to the United States
under the Treaty of Washington following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. The allies agreed, barely 24 hours
after the attacks, that if the acts were the responsibility of a foreign
source, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty could be invoked by the United
States, thereby calling on all NATO members to treat the attack as an attack
on themselves, and to decide what to do in response.
NATO’s
collective defense commitment in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was
designed in 1949 largely to deter the Soviet Union
from attacking Western Europe. Throughout the Cold War, it was in
most respects a US
commitment to defend Europe, including the
possible use of nuclear weapons, in the case of such an attack. The provision was never invoked, and
the end of the Cold War seemed to make it less likely that it would become a
factor in the post-Cold War era. However, in the discussions of NATO’s strategy in the 1990s,
wise US officials and experts pointed out that the
collective defense provision could come into play as a result of new
challenges, including terrorist attacks. Who could have expected that the first instance would be a horrendous
and brutal attack on thousands of innocent US citizens?
As
the Bush administration considers its response, a high priority has been
placed on developing an international coalition, not only for the political
support it will yield but also for the potential military assistance of other
nations. Our NATO allies are the
most militarily capable of all our allies, and might be expected to
contribute not just base access but also some military forces, if needed.
Will
the allies be able to pass the next test as easily as they passed the first? Probably not. Much will depend on what the Bush
administration asks them to do. As was demonstrated in the air war against Serbia in 1999, the Europeans
cannot currently match the high-end military capabilities that the United States
deploys, particularly in air power. However, if counter-terrorist operations include assaults on terrorist
enclaves in difficult terrain, some of the NATO allies – particularly Britain and
France – may indeed have select forces that could and should go into
combat alongside US units.
During
the NATO strategy debates leading up to the agreement on NATO’s
strategic concept of 1999, the European allies resisted further expansion of
NATO’s possible missions. They had already accepted a broad interpretation of NATO’s
mandate to mount military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The challenges in the Balkans were,
after all, in Europe and a threat to
European stability. But allies
were reluctant to give carte blanche approval for so-called “out of area” operations
at great distance from Europe’s
shores, as any military action in response to the terrorist attacks
undoubtedly will be.
It
seems clear that the Bush administration and the allies will want to ensure
that the response to the terrorist attacks strengthens America’s
most important alliance instead of undermining it. As a start, the administration should
muster the best evidence and intelligence it can about the sources of support
for the terrorist attacks. This
part of the process already offers the allies an opportunity to
contribute. No country,
particularly the United
States, will want to reveal sensitive
sources and methods by which individual pieces of intelligence are
obtained. However, in this case
all coalition countries will have to be as open as possible about the
information they develop and exchange with the others. The United States needs to set the
example to encourage other countries to make their best efforts both in
collection and sharing of intelligence information about the terrorists.
Beyond
the intelligence aspect, the United
States should be careful to ask allies to
do only things that they are capable of doing. It may, in fact, not be wise to make
the actual military operations against the terrorists a NATO-commanded operation. It might be best to use an ad hoc
coalition, hopefully including key NATO countries, to mount the actual
operations. However, the
background and support for the military action should be backed by a formal
NATO operation. The United States
should ask that a special NATO task force be created to help organize and
support future counter-terrorist military operations.
In
the best case, President Bush will follow his father’s Gulf War example
and build a strong enough case against the culprits to get a UN Security
Council Resolution that would support military action against the
terrorists. The question is how
far Russia
and China
will be willing to go in authorizing military action. Both governments have taken strong
stands against terrorism and denounced the attacks, but they will not want to
give the US
a free hand for future military operations
A
UN resolution would clearly facilitate the participation of a wide range of
nations in the operations. It
would liberate all NATO countries from reticence some might otherwise have
about an operation without an international mandate. They already have the Washington
Treaty’s self-defense provision, legitimized in the UN Charter, as a
legal foundation. But a UN
resolution would be better.
Finally,
the NATO allies must avoid at all cost the perception that they do not
support the United States
in responding to the terrorist threat. As detailed plans for military operations develop, support for the United States
will come with prices tags attached for the NATO countries, including
possible domestic opposition, increased vulnerability to terrorist strikes,
and combat casualties of their own. The allies, if appropriately involved in the decisionmaking
process, must be willing to pay the price. Failure to do so could mean the
effective end of the transatlantic alliance in a fashion that would undermine
both US and European security for decades to come.
June 11, 2001 NATO Enlargement
…. a view from The Atlantic Community Initiative
Continuing the parallel but
independent processes of NATO and EU enlargement is in the best interest of
the Atlantic Community nations.
It is in the nature of the EU process to move ahead at a slow but deliberate
pace. Meanwhile, the
NATO process is at a critical crossroads. There is no groundswell of official or
unofficial support for the next round among European NATO members. It falls to the Administration of
George W. Bush in the United
States to prepare the way for the next
phase.
Two countries, Slovenia and Slovakia, are widely accepted to be
qualified (according to the guidelines in the Study on NATO Enlargement http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm ) to be issued
an invitation when the NATO summit is held in Prague, The Czech Republic,
next year. If they stay on track,
they should be invited.
The tough issue comes next: should one (Lithuania)
or all three (Lithuania
plus Latvia
and Estonia)
of the Baltic states be invited as well? According to NATO standards, Lithuania may
be best prepared for an invitation, but the others are not far behind. If it is decided to confront the
question next year, should NATO begin the process of inviting Baltic states
by inviting only Lithuania and deal with Moscow’s reaction
incrementally, or all at once, by inviting all three.
The issue of 2, 3 or 5 awaits decisions by the Bush Administration
this autumn. The conservative
approach would be to defer Baltic invitations until the next round. However, a strong case can be made for
getting it over with, and inviting all three Baltic
states to join at the Prague
summit.